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Automobile Guest Statutes-INFANTS UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS oF AGE
HELD INCAPABLE OF ACCEPTING GUEST STATUs-Smith vi. Kauffman
Virginia's guest statute' is a legislative codification of the common law
gross negligence rule made applicable to automobile guests.2 The purpose of
this statute is to protect the gratuitous host from a lawsuit at the hands of
the very person to whom he is extending the gratuity, and to prevent collu-
sion between the host and his guest against insurers.3 The increasing popu-
larity of automobile travel has prompted over half of the states to adopt
similar legislation,4 but unfortunately, these statutes have produced what has
been appropriately called a "tangle of confusion." '
Not the least among the difficulties presented is the question whether an
infant may assume guest status. A guest within the meaning of the Virginia
Guest Statute is a person whom the owner or possessor of the vehicle invites
or permits to ride with him gratuitously. 6 In order for a guest to recover
1VA. CODE AN. § 8-646.1 (1957) provides in part that "[nlo person transported
by the owner or operator of any motor vehicle as a guest without payment . . .shall
be entitled to recover damages . . .unless such ... injury was caused or resulted
from the gross negligence ... of such owner or operator."
2 The Virginia Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that § 8-646.1
represents a codification of the rule set down in Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160
S.E. 77 (1931). See Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 182, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971);
Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450, 455, 143 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1965); Sibley v. Slayton,
193 Va. 470, 474, 69 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1952); Wright v. Osborne, 175 Va. 442, 445,
9 SZE.2d 452, 454 (1940). Prior to Boggs, the established rule in Virginia was that
the owner or operator of an automobile was liable to a guest for failure to exercise
ordinary care. In Boggs, the court overturned this rule and adopted the minority
view set down in the Massachusetts case of Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118
N.E. 168 (1917). There the court stated: "[Jiustice requires that to make out liability
in case of a gratuitous undertaking the plaintiff ought to prove a materially greater
degree of negligence than he has to prove where the defendant is to be paid for
doing the same thing." Id. at 496, 118 N.E. at 177.
3 Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67, 68 (1954); Rosenbaum
v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1970); Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa
958, 90 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1958); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 187
(4th ed. 1971); Note, Recovery By Child Under Iowa Guest Statute, 41 IOwA L.
R~v. 648, 650 (1956); 33 TExAs L. REv. 253, 254 (1954); 11 U. FLA. L. Rav. 124 (1958).
454 Nw. U.L. REv. 263 nn.2 & 3 (1960). For a list of states which have guest
statutes see Am. JuR. 2d DFSK BOOK, Doc. No. 123 and Comment, The Need for
Clarification: Should a Child Under the Age of Seven Be Included Within the
Provisions of Automobile Guest Statutes? 75 DICK. L. REv. 432 n.8 (1971).
5 W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 382 (4th ed. 1971).
6 Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1940). "The word 'guest' is used to
denote one whom the owner or possessor of a motor car or other vehicle invites
or permits to ride with him as a gratuity, that is, without any financial return,
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against the owner or possessor of the vehicle, he must show that his injuries
resulted from gross negligence or the willful and wanton disregard of his
safety.7
The jurisdictions which have considered the applicability of the guest
statute to infants have produced divergent results,8 and may be properly
classified into three distinct groups. The first of these holds as a matter of
law that a child of "tender years" is a guest within the meaning of the
statute.9 These courts reason that since the statute makes no exception in
favor of minors, they have no authority to include such an exception within
the statute.' 0 Following this same view, other courts have stated unequiv-
ocally that the weight of authority indicates that infants may assume guest
status, even though unaccompanied by, and without the consent of, a
parent or guardian."
except such slight benefits as it is customary to extend as a part of the ordinary
courtesies of the road." Id. at 679.
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957).
S1or a collection of cases on this subject see 8 AM. JuR. 2d Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 483 (1963); Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1304 (1951) (Later Case Service at 945);
5 BLAsHFiwx, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAcricE § 214.6 (1966); 60A C.J.S. Motor Ve-
icles § 399.13 (1969); see 75 Dicx. L. REv., supra note 4, at 432.
9Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229, 199 S.W.2d 943 (1947), (7, 9, 14 yrs. old);
Lynott v. Sells, 52 Del. 385, 158 A.2d 583 (Super Ct. 1958) (5 yrs. old). After
noting the "acceptance theory" and rejecting it, the Lynott court said: "The better
view, it seems to me, and probably the majority view of American jurisdictions,
does not except minors from the operation of Guest Statutes." Id. at 386, 158 A.2d
at 585. The court went on to say that jurisdictions which do except minors, limit
this exception to minors who are guests without parental permission. Brailsford v.
Campbell, 89 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1956); In re Wright's Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d
911 (1951) (4 yrs. old); Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan 814, 89 P.2d 866 (1939) (7
yrs. old); Letterel v. Cerniglia, 274 App. Div. 896, 82 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1948) (11 yrs.
old); Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 45 Ohio Op. 2d 67, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968)
(8 yrs. old); see Ortman v. Smith, 198 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
US. 856 (1952) (13 yrs. old); Audia v. De Angelis, 121 Conn. 336, 185 A. 78 (1936)
(14 yrs. old); Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934) (13 yrs. old);
Johnson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 9 IIl. App. 2d 340, 132 N.E.2d 678 (1956) (8 yrs.
old) (by implication); Falden v. Crook, 342 Mass. 173, 172 N.E.2d 686 (1961) (11
yrs. old); Marshall v. Carter, 301 Mass. 372, 17 N.E.2d 205 (1938) (531 yrs. old);
Mitzel v. Hauck, 78 S.D. 543, 105 N.W2d 378 (1960); Schlitz v. Picton, 66 S.D.
301, 282 N.W. 519 (1938) (10 yrs. old).
10 "It will be observed that in defining a guest the statute makes no exception in
favor of minors and we have no authority to write that exception into the statute."
Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229, 199 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1947) (7, 9, 14 yrs. old);
accord, Lynott v. Sells, 52 Del. 385, 158 A.2d 583 (Super Ct. 1958) (5 yrs. old);
Kolar v. Divis, 179 Neb. 756, 140 N.W.2d 658 (1966) (13 yrs. old). "It is the province
of the Legislature to change the statute and not that of this court." Id. at 761, 140
N.W.2d at 663. Linn v. Noted, 133 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
11 Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814, 89 P.2d 866 (1939) (7 yrs. old). "The weight
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A second group of cases hold that a child of "tender years" may assume
guest status depending on the presence of parental consent.'2 Here the
courts have found either a provision in the statute,13 or read into the
statute,14 a requirement of acceptance, 15 either express,1 or implied,17 of
of authority is that a minor as well as an adult can be a 'guest' even though unac-
companied by parent or guardian, and even though no express consent of parent or
guardian has been shown." Id. at 816, 89 P.2d at 868. Accord, In re Wright's Estate,
170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951) (4 yrs. old). But see In re Wright's Estate, supra
at 917 (dissenting opinion).
12 See Coleman v. Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co., 337 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1964)
(applying Georgia law); Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935)
(5 yrs. old); Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484 (1964) (11 yrs. old);
Chancey v. Cobb, 102 Ga. App. 636, 117 S.E.2d 189 (1960); Whitfield v. Bruegel,
134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963) (6 yrs. old); Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa
958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958) (13 days old); Balian v. Ogassian, 227 Mass. 525, 179 N.E.
232 (1931) (42 yrs. old); Wendel v. Shaw, 361 Mo. 416, 235 S.W.2d 266 (1950)
(Kan. statute); Snelling v. Pieper, 178 Neb. 818, 135 N.W.2d 707 (1965); Welker v.
Sorenson, 209 Or. 402, 306 P.2d 737 (1957) (29 mos. old); Favatella v. Poulsen, 17
Utah 2d 24, 403 P.2d 918 (1965) (7 yrs. old).
13 See Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 417, 269 P.2d 67, 68 n.1 (1954) (15
mos., 24 mos. old); Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935) (5 yrs.
old); Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958; 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958) (13 days old). "The
California statute ... defines a guest as one who 'accepts a ride in any vehicle upon
a highway without giving compensation for such a ride."' Id. at 961, 90 N.W.2d
at 44.
14 See Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (2 yrs. old); Kudrna
v. Adamski, 188 Or. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950) (4 yrs. old). Here the statute does
not contain the word "accept" but "this court has defined a guest as one who
'accepts' a ride." Id. at 398, 216 P.2d at 264.
15 Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935) (5 yrs. old). "To be a
guest one must have accepted the ride in the vehicle involved." Id. at 248, 44 P.2d
at 482. Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (2 yrs. old). "The status
of 'guest' under the statute is acquired only by knowingly and voluntarily accepting
the invitation to become so." Id. at 515, 319 P.2d at 1806. Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45
Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970)! (4 yrs. old). "The term guest, as used in the
statute, contemplates some sort of extension of hospitality and acceptance thereof as
a requisite of that status." Id. at 26, 257 N.E.2d at 102. Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind.
App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941) (6 yrs. old).
16 See Coleman v. Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co., 337 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1964);
Chancey v. Cobb, 102 Ga. App. 636, 117 S.E.2d 189 (1960). "A minor child of tender
years riding at the invitation of the driver and owner of an automobile, with express
consent and acceptance of its mother, even though, on account of its tender years,
incapable of itself giving consent or accepting the invitation, is a guest. . . . Id. at
636, 117 S.E.2d at 189. Favatella v. Poulsen, 17 Utah 2d 24, 403 P.2d 918 (1965)
(7 yrs. old).
17 See Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (1954) (15 mos,
24 mos. old); Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484 (1964) (11 yrs.
old); Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963) (6 yrs old).
"Therefore, as a matter of law the father by permitting an unlimited and unrestricted
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the invitation 8 extended by the host as a requisite to becoming a guest.,
These courts reason that if the child himself is too young to be capable of
accepting, then his parents,' 9 or the person in whom custody has been en-
trusted,20 may accept for him. This line of reasoning finds the acceptance
by the parent to be analogous to the numerous other important decisions
which the law allows the parent to make on behalf of the child.21
IA very small minority of jurisdictions, making up the third group, hold
as a matter of law, that a child of "tender years" cannot be a guest within
the meaning of the statute.22 Disregarding parental consent, but ascribing
custody relationship between the defendant and the minor child had implied his
consent. . . .Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the child was a guest... ,'
Id. at 638, 190 NZE.2d at 672. Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814, 89 P.2d 866 (1939)
(7 yrs. old). Since there were no directions or admonitions by the parent against
taking the child on automobile trips, the "[diefendant's custody under such circum--
stances certainly implies a reasonable latitude in the care of the child." Id. at 817,
89 P.2d at 868. In Wendel v. Shaw, 361 Mo. 416, 235 S.W.2d 266 (1950) it was held
that the defendant was transporting the child of tender years with the,'implied con-
sent of the parents and therefore the child had "accepted" the invitation.
l8 Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 NZE.2d 670 (1941) (6 yrs old). "A guest
... is one who is invited either directly or by implication to enjoy the hospitality
of the driver. . . ." Id. at 409, 31 NE.2d at 672.
19 Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958) (13 days old). "There seems
no good reason why the natural guardian, usually the parent, could not accept an'
invitation to ride gratuitously in a motor vehicle, for the child." Id. at 960, 90 N.W2d
at 44. Accord, Chancey v. Cobb, 102 Ga. App. 636, 117 S.E.2d 189 (1960); see Coleman
v. Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co., 337 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1964); Buckner v. Vetterick,
124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d (1954) (15 mos., 26 mos. old). "[W]hen a parent accepts
a ride as a guest of the operator of a motor vehicle and takes along her small children
she also accepts the ride for them. . . ." Id. at 419, 269 P.2d at 69. Rocha v. Hulen,
6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935) (5 yrs. old); Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148,
135 S.E.2d 484 (1964) (11 yrs. old); Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d
670 (1963) (6 yrs. old); Snelling v. Pieper, 178 Neb. 818, 135 N.W.2d 707 (1965);
Welker v. Sorenson, 209 Or. 402, 306 P.2d 737 (1957) (29 mos. old).
20 Balian v. Ogassian, 227 Mass. 525, 179 N.E. 232 (1931) (4Y/ yrs old). Here it was
held that the grandmother as custodian could consent on behalf of the child.
21 Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (1954) (15 mos., 26 mos.
old).
Many decisions of more importance and involving greater hazard are made by
parents for their small children daily. An example is the right of a parent to.
consent to an operation on his child and the right of the surgeon to rely on that
consent. The same principle prevails where an adult child is an incompetent and
has no legally appointed guardian. Thus a parent may speak and act for his child
when the child is legally incapable of acting for itself and others may properly
rely on the action of the parent in such circumstances. Id. at 419, 269 P.2d at 69.
Acord, Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958) (13 days old). But see,
33 TExAs L. REv. 253, 254 (1954).
22See Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (2 yrs. old); Rosenbaum
v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970) (4 yrs. old); Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind.
App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941) (6 yrs. old); Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 235, 134
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to the theory that acceptance is a prerequisite to the assumption of guest
status, these courts reason that a child of "tender years" is not possessed of
sufficient mental capacity to assume the risks inherent in automobile travel,
and consequently cannot accept guest status. 23
The Virginia Supreme Court was confronted with this problem in the
recent case of Smith v. Kauffman.24 In Smith, a seven-year-old child brought
an action against the administrator of her stepfather's estate to recover for
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident, allegedly as a result of
the stepfather's negligence. The trial court had held alternatively, that
even if the plaintiff could maintain the action,25 the guest statute provided
that her stepfather only owed a duty of slight care because the child was a
gratuitous guest-passenger. 26 In reversing this decision, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that "a child under the age of fourteen years is incapable of
knowingly and voluntarily accepting an invitation to become a guest in an
automobile so as to subject himself to the gross negligence rule." 27
The Smith court adopted the proposition that acceptance is a prerequisite
to the assumption of guest status,2 8 but rejected the concept of parental ac-
ceptance on behalf of the child.29 The court also impliedly held that parental
acceptance does not take into account the realities of the situation, 0 but
neglected to define these disqualifying realities. It follows from this reason-
ing that an infant's guest status rests solely on the capacity of the infant to
accept the invitation to become a guest in his own behalf. The court then
N.W.2d 225 (1965) (5, 7 yrs. old). In Burbans the court held children under seven not
to be guests as a matter of law, but as to children seven and over, the issue became a
question of fact for the jury. Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Or. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950)
(4 yrs. old); Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 (1933) (12 yrs. old).
Kudrna, Hart, and Fuller have been distinguished in Welker v. Sorenson, 209 Or.
402, 306 P.2d 737 (1957), Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 47, 269 P.2d 67
(1954), and Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963), and should
not be held to stand for the proposition that as a matter of law a child cannot be a
guest.
23 Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (2 yrs. old); Rosenbaum v.
Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 NE.2d 100 (1970) (4 yrs. old).
24 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
25 Id. at 182, 183 S.E.2d at 191-92. The stepfather stood in loco parentis to the child
and as a result was immune from liability. On appeal the court abolished the intra
family tort immunity in actions involving automobile negligence.
26 Id. at 182, 183 S.E.2d at 192.
27 Id. at 187, 183 SZE.2d at 195.
28 Id. at 187, 183 S.E.2d at 195.
29 Id. at 187, 183 S.E.2d at 195.
80 The court impliedly adopts the reasoning in Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25,
257 NE.2d 100 (1970) where it was held that parental consent does not take into ac-
count the realities of the situation. Rosenbaum cites Prosser as authority but neither
Smith, Rosenbaum, nor Prosser elect to define these realities.
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pronounced the rule that a child under the age of fourteen is not possessed
of this capacity. This decision places Virginia squarely in line with the
minority of jurisdictions which hold as a matter of law that a child of "tender
years" cannot be a guest within the meaning of the statute.
The jurisdictions in the first group which draw no distinction between
infants and adults are not confronted with the problem of the capacity of a
child to accept guest status. However, those courts which do ascribe to the
"acceptance theory" find it necessary to draw a line with respect to the
age of the child. Most of these jurisdictions find an analogy in the common
law principle that a child between the ages of zero and seven is non sui juris
and incapable of negligence.31 A child of this age therefore would also be
incapable of assuming a risk, and consequently, could not accept guest
status and become a guest in the absence of parental consent. With respect
to children betveen the ages of seven and fourteen, the common law pre-
sumption of no negligence is rebuttable.32 Accordingly then, in the absence
of parental consent, the question of assumption of risk and acceptance of
guest status becomes one for the trier of fact based on the age, intelligence,
and experience of the child.P
The Smith court noted the above proposition, but rejected it, implying
that the capacity to assume a risk was not readily comparable to the capacity
to be negligent. This reasoning seemingly suggests the tenuous proposition
that it requires more intelligence and judgment on the part of a child to
assume a risk than it does to be guilty of negligence.3 4 This result rightly
provided the basis for the dissenting opinion.3 5 The principle of assumption
of risk is derived from the law of contracts and is based on consent.36
Under the guest statute, assumption of risk involves consent to ordinary
negligence.37 This amounts to an election to run the everyday risks inherent
in automobile travel without recourse against the host.38 Negligence is
31 See Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935) (5 yrs. old); Rosen-
baum v. Raskin, 45 IlM. 2d 25, 257 NZE.2d 100 (1970) (4 yrs. old); Fuller v. Thrun, 109
Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941) (6 yrs. old); Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253,
134 N.W.2d 225 (1965) (5, 7 yrs. old); Kudrna v. Adamsld, 188 Or. 396, 216 P.2d 262
(1950) (4 yrs. old).
3 2 See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 IMI. 2d 25, 257 NE.2d 100 (1970) (4 yrs. old);
Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965) (5, 7 yrs. old); Smith v.
Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 187, 183 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1971).
33 Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W2d 225, 227 (1965), (5, 7 yrs. old).
34 Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 188, 183 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1971) (dissenting
opinion).
35Id.
36 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 117 (1950); 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 316, 319 (1961).
67See Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931).
38 Id. at 39, 160 S.E. at 81.
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derived from the law of torts and is based on fault.39 Fault results from
recognizing or failing to recognize a risk, and running it. when the magnitude
of the risk outweighs the utility of the conduct.40 Both principles involve
the election to run a risk. Accordingly then, it should not require more
intelligence to do so in the former case than it does in the latter.
The decision in Smith circumvented a small amount of Virginia case
authority which, by way of implication, would seem to have produced an
opposite result.4 1 It also represents an unwarranted extension of what might
be termed a recent trend42 to exclude infants from the operation of guest
statutes. This holding is likely to result in the anomalous situation in which
a host will be liable for a greater degree of care to a child than he would be
to an accompanying parent.43 It should be noted that the two cases relied
on by the Virginia Court dealt with children of ages two and four. These
courts referred to children of "tender years." In an examination of all cases
dealing with this issue, it will be found that the phrase "tender years" has
been used in conjunction with children of considerably younger age than
the limit prescribed by the Virginia Court.44
In their efforts to establish the rule, the court in Smith was faced with a
seven-year-old, a child just beyond the zero to seven age category. Thus,
in a laudable attempt to provide for future expediency and to avoid vagueness
in interpretation, the court adopted the next "logical" dividing line at age
fourteen. Had the plaintiff in Smith been below the age of seven, the law
in Virginia might very well be different today.
A solution more in keeping with the purpose of the statute would be to
accept the proposition of parental consent.45 Then, in its absence, to apply
39 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 117 (1950); 18 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 319 (1961).
40 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
41 See Laughorn v. Eanes, 207 Va. 584, 151 S.E.2d 378 (1966); Ruett v. Nottingham,
200 Va. 722, 107 S.E.2d 402 (1959). The question as to whether a child could become a
guest was not decided by either case. However, both cases impliedly held that a child
may become a guest, as no recovery was allowed in the absence of gross negligence.42Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 111. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970) (4 yrs. old); Cox v.
Nicholes, 122 Ill. App. 2d 252, 258 N.E.2d 394 (1970) (6 yrs. old); Burhans v. Witbeck,
375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965) (5, 7 yrs. old); Kelly v. Bywater, 18 Mich. App.
238, 171 N.W.2d 58 (1969). Although these recent cases have held that a child is not
a guest as a matter of law, none of them have specifically set an age limit as high as
the Virginia court in Smith.
431Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67, 68 (1954) (15 mos., 26
mos. old).
44 See the commentary within the footnotes for the ages of the children.
45 Parental consent should be considered only where the parent accompanies the
child in the vehicle. The parent would then be in the position to terminate the host-
guest relationship at any time by protesting negligent conduct on the part of the host,
thereby protecting the child's right of recovery which would otherwise be lost. 75
DIcK. L. REv., supra note 4, at 444.
[Vol. 6; 370
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the common law presumptions regarding the capacity of infants to be negli-
gent, in their entirety, to the principles of assumption of risk. Such a solution
would then provide that in the absence of parental consent, a child between
the ages of zero and seven would be incapable of accepting guest status, and
cases involving children from seven to fourteen would present a question
of fact for the jury. The language in Smith, however, is explicit, and leaves
no room for any further judicial interpretation. This decision forecasts an
increase in litigation as it has added thousands of persons to the list of
prospective plaintiffs. Furthermore, the increase in litigation may well be
accompanied by an increase in collusion between the host and his guest in
an attempt to defraud insurers. The propriety of the Smith decision
therefore is questionable since the aggregrate result is directly contra to
the purpose of the statute.
W. L. P. III
